Great Britain's attitude towards Austrian independence
The German Embassy in Great Britain to the German Foreign Ministry - Chamberlain did not accept the French view on the importance of Austrian independence
Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, vol. I, pp.553-556. A 1097 (Pol. IV 1453)
LONDON, March 4, 1938
In continuation of the report of the 2nd - A 995
Subject: Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons regarding the Berchtesgaden Agreements. During the session of the House of Commons on March 2, Arthur Henderson again raised the question of the German-Austrian Agreement. He repeated the assertion of numerous papers that the Fuehrer had enforced his demands on Austria by threatening the impairment of Austrian independence. The Berchtesgaden Agreement was the worst example of secret diplomacy, Henderson continued. On an earlier occasion the Prime Minister had declared that, in the opinion of the British Government, the steps taken by the Austrian Government in implementing the Agreement represented no violation of the obligations assumed by Austria. According to the Geneva Protocol of 1922 and article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, the Austrian Government had undertaken not to renounce Austrian independence. It was now apparent that at Berchtesgaden the Federal Chancellor had assumed the obligation of settling domestic Austrian affairs in accordance with the wishes of the German Chancellor. He wished, therefore, to ask the Prime Minister two questions: first, whether the legal advisers to the Crown had examined the various legal aspects and the circumstances under which the Agreement had been reached, and, secondly, whether the British Government had reserved the right to bring the question before the Council of the League of Nations. He wished, moreover, to remind the Prime Minister of the recent declaration by the French Foreign Minister, who had called Austrian independence an essential element of European peace, and he wanted to ask the Prime Minister whether he did not wish to take the opportunity of joining M. Delbos in this courageous declaration. He would thereby give great moral support to the Austrian people in their struggle for the preservation of its independence. In his answer Mr. Chamberlain stated that the Geneva Protocol of 1920 [sic] referred only to financial and economic questions. According to the opinion of the British Government, which relied upon the counsel of its legal advisers, there was juridically no violation of article 88 of the Treaty of St. German. What had happened was merely that two statesmen had agreed upon certain measures for the improvement of relations between their two countries. These measures included a general amnesty for all political offenders, including Socialists and Communists. He wishes to recall that, in addition to the appointment of Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior, other changes had been made in the Cabinet, which apparently had not been suggested by the Fuehrer. Juridically it appeared hardly possible to insist that just because two statesmen had agreed on certain domestic changes in one of the two countries - changes desirable in the interest of relations between them - the one country had renounced its independence in favour of the other. On the contrary, he believed that those who had read the Federal Chancellor's speech of February 24 agreed with him that this speech contained nothing that might convey the impression that the federal Chancellor himself believed in the surrender of the independence of his country. For the rest, the practical results of the Berchtesgaden Agreements would have to be awaited, but he wishes to add that the British Government could not remain unconcerned about events in Central Europe, if for no other reason than that the aim of its policy was to aid in bringing about a feeling of greater security and confidence in Europe. This aim would inevitably be affected by events in any part of Europe. In this connection he had read with great interest the recent statements by Delbos regarding this question. At the present time it was too early to appraise the effects of the German-Austrian Agreements. First, it was necessary to wait and see how the obligations assumed would be carried out by each party. He was happy to learn from the Fuehrer and Chancellor's speech of February 20 that the Berchtesgaden Agreements were to be considered as an expansion of the framework of the German-Austrian Agreement of July 11, 1936. This contained, among other things, the recognition of full Austrian sovereignty by the German Government. The British Government, for the time being, had to leave it at that, but it would follow further events in Austria with the greatest possible vigilance and interest. It is significant that Chamberlain left unanswered Henderson's question as to whether he would join Delbos in his statements regarding the German-Austrian question. The text of the two speeches is found in the official record of parliamentary proceedings of March 2, volume 332, No. 65, column 1247 ff. It is enclosed.
